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Abstract
The commented article attempts to prove a “General theorem” giving
sufficient conditions under which a previously introduced “general condi-
tioned average” “converges uniquely to the quantum weak value in the
minimal disturbance limit.” The “general conditioned average” is ob-
tained from a positive operator valued measure (POVM) {Eˆj(g)}
n
j=1 de-
pending on a small “weakness” parameter g. We point out that unstated
assumptions in the presentation of the “sufficient conditions” make them
appear much more general than they actually are. Indeed, the stated “suf-
ficient conditions” strengthened by these unstated assumptions seem very
close to an assumption that the POVM operators Eˆj(g) be linear poly-
nomials (i.e., of first order in g). Moreover, there appears to be a critical
error or gap in the attempted proof, even assuming a linear POVM. A
counterexample to the proof of the “General theorem” (though not to its
conclusion) is given. Nevertheless, I conjecture that the conclusion is ac-
tually true for linear POVM’s whose contextual values are chosen by the
commented article’s “pseudoinverse prescription”.
1 Relation between traditional “weak measure-
ment” theory and the “contextual value” ap-
proach of [1]
1.1 General introduction
This is an expanded version of a paper submitted to J. Phys. A commenting on
[1] (called DJ below). DJ attempts to refute counterexamples given in [7] to a
“General theorem” (GT). The “Comment” paper discusses the validity of these
∗For contact information, go to http://www.math.umb.edu/∼sp
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2counterexamples and gives a new counterexample to the proof (though not to
the conclusion) of the GT.
The submitted paper had to be written more tersely in order to keep its
length appropriate for a “Comment” paper and may be incomprehensible to
anyone not already familiar with DJ. This expanded version adds the present
Section 1 introduction together with an appendix which analyzes in detail some
logical problems with the stated hypotheses of the GT.
For orientation I first give a brief description of my view of the notion of
“contextual values”, introduced in [3] (called DAJ below)1 and expounded by
Dressel and Jordan in more detail in [4]2 and the paper DJ under review [1].
My views are presented in more detail in [6]3 and [7]. The review assumes that
the reader has some familiarity with the ideas of weak measurement. A more
leisurely exposition of these can be found in [8] and references cited there. To
minimize confusion, I try to use the notation of DJ wherever practical, even
though it is not the notation that I would choose.
One minor exception is that I usually write 〈u|Aˆv〉 instead of 〈u|Aˆ|v〉 as in
DJ’s (1.1). The reason is that all the type was set before noticing this small
difference, and attempting to change it risks more confusion than retaining it
in case some instances which should be changed go unnoticed.
1.2 Weak measurement
“Weak measurement”, introduced in [5], is in part a technique for measuring the
expectation of a quantum observable Aˆ in a given state s without appreciably
changing the state. This can be accomplished as follows.
Suppose the observable Aˆ operates on a Hilbert space S. Couple S to an
auxiliary “meter space” M , obtaining a new Hilbert space S ⊗M which is the
tensor product of S and M .
With each state s of S, associate a slightly entangled state Uˆs ∈ S ⊗M ,
where Uˆ is a isometry4 from S to S ⊗M . Find a “meter observable” Bˆ on
M such that the expectation of Iˆ ⊗ Bˆ in the state Uˆs is almost the same as
the expectation of Aˆ in the state s, where Iˆ generically denotes the identity
operator on whatever space is relevant in the context (in this case S).
1 The reader should be warned that DAJ is vaguely written with many errors and omissions
of important definitions and hypotheses.
2[4] is written in an unusual, complicated notation different from both DAJ and DJ. It
contains what the authors characterize as a “slight generalization” of the “General theorem”
of the first arXiv version of DJ. The discussion of the GT in [4] gives no indication that its
validity is disputed in [7].
3 The reader should be warned that the six versions of [6] were written over a period of
months as I tried to make sense of the vaguely written and error-ridden DAJ, and an evolution
of its ideas from earlier to later versions will be apparent. The presentation may seem unusual
in that introductions to the later versions were simply prepended to rewritten earlier versions.
The presentation of [7] is more concise.
4An isometry Uˆ is a linear transformation which preserves inner products: 〈Uˆv|Uˆw〉 =
〈v|w〉 for all v, w. The only difference between an isometry and a unitary operator is that an
isometry need not be surjective (i.e., “onto”).
3To make this precise, introduce a small real “weak measurement” parame-
ter g with Uˆ = Uˆ(g) depending on g . In terms of this parameter, “slightly
entangled” is interpreted as
lim
g→0
Uˆ(g)s = s⊗m , (1)
an unentangled product state, where m is some state of m.
Denote the projector onto the subspace spanned by a nonzero vector v as
Pˆ v. A routine calculation shows that the preceding paragraph guarantees that
the (mixed) state of S corresponding to Uˆ(g)s, namely TrM Pˆ Uˆ(g)s, where TrM
denotes partial trace with respect to M , approaches Pˆ s (i.e., the original pure
state s written in mixed state notation) as g → 0. Similarly “the expectation
of Iˆ ⊗ Bˆ in the state Uˆ(g)s is almost the same as the expectation of Aˆ in the
state s” is interpreted as holding exactly in the limit g → 0:
lim
g→0
〈Uˆ(g)s, (Iˆ ⊗ Bˆ)Uˆ(g)s〉 = 〈s|Aˆs〉 . (2)
The mathematics of DJ can easily be made rigorous only under the as-
sumption that all Hilbert spaces occurring are finite dimensional, so that all
observables have discrete spectra. Let {fj}
n
j=1 denote a collection of orthonor-
mal eigenvectors of Bˆ, with αj the corresponding eigenvalues, which we assume
distinct5 for expositional simplicity. We shall allow the αj = αj(g) to depend
on g, which implies that Bˆ = Bˆ(g) also depends on g. In principle, one could
also allow the eigenvectors fj to depend on g, but for simplicity we assume that
they are constant. (This assumption can be justified by making appropriate
identifications.)
Write
Uˆ(g)s =
∑
j
Mˆj(g)s⊗ fj , (3)
where this defines the “measurement” operators Mˆj(g) on S. These measure-
ment operators define a positive operator valued measure (POVM) {Eˆj(g)} on S
by Eˆj(g) := Mˆj
†
(g)Mˆj(g). The probability P (j) that a measurement of Iˆ⊗ Bˆ
in state Uˆ(g)s will produce result j is the norm-squared of the fj-component of
(3):
P (j) = |Mˆ j(g)s|
2 = 〈s|Eˆj(g)s〉 . (4)
From (4), the expectation 〈Uˆ(g)s, (Iˆ ⊗ Bˆ)Uˆ(g)s〉 of Iˆ ⊗ Bˆ in the state Uˆ(g)s
is
〈Uˆ (g)s, (Iˆ ⊗ Bˆ)Uˆ(g)s〉 =
∑
j
αjP (j) =
∑
j
αj(g)〈s|Eˆj(g)s〉 . (5)
Since the probabilities P (j) depend only on data in S, by allowing the eigen-
values αj = αj(g) to depend on g, we might hope to choose them to satisfy the
5The slightly subtle reason is discussed in [6].
4desired relation
〈Uˆ(g)s, (Iˆ ⊗ Bˆ(g))Uˆ(g)s〉 =
∑
j
αj(g)P (j) = 〈s|Aˆs〉 , (6)
which says that the expectation of the system observable Aˆ in the state s could
also be obtained by measuring the expectation of the meter observable Bˆ(g)
in the state Uˆ(g)s. The advantage of measuring Bˆ(g) instead of Aˆ is that for
small g, the (unnormalized) state of S after measurement result j is obtained,
namely Mˆ j(g)s, is very close to s because of (1).
6
However, it is important to realize that only in special cases can one hope to
attain (6) for all small g 6= 0. In general, given Uˆ(g), the required αj(g) need
not exist. The original formulation of weak measurement theory by Aharonov,
Albert, and Vaidman [5] used a particular Uˆ(g) originally proposed by von
Neumann [11] which guarantees (6).
Note, however, that if we are only interested in weak measurements, (and in
the opposite case, it is not clear why we would choose such a roundabout way
to measure 〈s|Aˆs〉), we do not need (6) for all g, but only for small g 6= 0. That
is, we need only
lim
g→0
〈Uˆ(g)s, (Iˆ ⊗ Bˆ(g))Uˆ(g)s〉 =
∑
j
αj(g)P (j) = 〈s|Aˆs〉 , (7)
The above formulation of the concept of “weak measurement” (which is similar
to [8]) requires only (7).
The difference between (6) and (7) might seem slight and technical, but it
is actually substantial. That is because it is much easier to attain (7) than the
stronger (6), though given Uˆ(g), (7) is not guaranteed, either.
The above discussion sketches a formulation of weak measurement theory
which gives a more or less direct translation into the language of DAJ and DJ.
Weak measurement theory is traditionally formulated in terms of a “system”
Hilbert space S and a “meter” space M with a “meter observable” Bˆ. The
setup of DAJ and DJ replaces the meter space and meter observable by a set
of measurement operators on S, and the strong equation (6) is assumed. The
eigenvalues αj(g) of the meter observable Bˆ are renamed “contextual values”
in the DAJ formulation.7 It seems clear that any statement about the meter
observable can be translated into a statement about measurement operators in
S and conversely,
In summary, traditional measurement theory is formulated in a system+meter
space S⊗M . I view the contextual value theory of DAJ and DJ as a conceptu-
ally similar formulation in system space S alone. Its chief merit (which should
not be underestimated) seems to me to be its simplicity.
6This looks reasonable, but requires some calculation.
7The correspondence between projective measurements (identified with observables) in
S ⊗M and measurement operators in S is of course well known (cf. the text [10], section
2.2.8). Indeed, I suspect that it may be what DJ is talking about in the second paragraph of
its section 2. (It is hard to be sure because their symbol Uˆsd is not defined.)
51.3 Postselection
Most applications of weak measurement theory involve more than mere weak
measurement as described above. Typically, after making a weak measurement
one “postselects” to a given final state sf ∈ S. This means that one performs a
second projective measurement (with respect to the orthogonal decomposition
{Pˆ sf , Iˆ − Pˆ sf }) to see if after the first measurement, the system is in state sf
(“success”) or a state orthogonal to sf (“failure”).
8 (It would take us too far
afield to explain why one might want to do this.) This is done repeatedly start-
ing with the same initial state s, and only the results of “successful” trials are
retained. The (conditional) expectation of the meter measurement given suc-
cessful postselection is called a “weak value” of the system observable Aˆ.9 This
conditional expectation (with “meter measurement” replaced by “measurement
using given measurement operators”) is DAJ’s “general conditioned average”,
which is routinely calculated.
Weak values are not unique; in general they depend on the measurement
procedure. The seminal paper [5] calculated (via questionable mathematics) a
particular weak value for a particular measurement procedure. Since this cal-
culated weak value is generally nonreal (even though it is supposed to represent
the procedure described above which would result in a weak value which is man-
ifestly real), most subsequent authors replace it with its real part. The weak
value calculated by [5] is equation (1.1) of DJ, written in a notation different
from that of DJ (and the present paper) which is common in the “weak value”
literature:
Aw =
〈ψf |Aˆ|ψi〉
〈ψf |ψi〉
. (1.1)
Here ψi represents the initial state of the system S (called s above), ψf the
postselected final state (called sf above), and Aw stands for “weak value of Aˆ”.
DJ’s (1.2) is a generalization of the real part of (1.1) to mixed states:
f 〈A〉w =
Tr(Eˆ
(2)
f (Aˆρˆ+ ρˆAˆ)
2Tr(Eˆ
(2)
f ρˆ)
. (1.2)
We shall refer to either the real part of (1.1) or (1.2) as the “traditional”
weak value (though I’ve not seen (1.2) in the literature prior to DAJ). Most of
the “weak value” literature seems to implicitly assume that the traditional weak
value is the only possible weak value.
In the contextual value approach, it is natural to ask which collections of
measurement operators {Mˆj(g)} will result in the traditional weak value in the
8For simplicity of exposition we restrict attention to postselection to a pure state, as does
DJ. DAJ considers postselection to a mixed state, but does not explain how this could be
physically accomplished.
9The “weak value” is often confused with the conditional expectation of Aˆ (instead of the
meter observable Bˆ), and it is important to keep the distinction in mind. The conditional
expectation of Aˆ must necessarily be a convex linear combination of the possible values (eigen-
values) for Aˆ, whereas the conditional expectation of Bˆ may lie far outside this set, as the
provocative title of [5] suggests.
6limit g → 0. DAJ claims without adequate proof that this will occur when the
measurement operators are positive. DJ formulates and attempts to prove a
“General theorem” (GT) with this conclusion. One might roughly summarize
the GT by the statement that the traditional weak value is essentially inevitable
when the measurement operators are positive and commute with each other and
the system observable Aˆ, and contextual values are chosen according to the so-
called “pseudoinverse prescription”.
Counterexamples to the GT are given in [7]. DJ attempts to refute these
counterexamples by reinterpreting (but unfortunately not restating in a logically
precise way) the hypotheses of the GT given in the first preprint version of
DJ, arXiv:1106.1871v1, to which [7] replied. The present work will make the
reinterpretations explicit and give a new counterexample to the proof of the GT
(though not to its conclusion) under its reinterpreted hypotheses.
2 The “Comment” paper submitted to J. Phys.
A
2.1 Circumstances
The following, from the next subsection 2.2 to the “Update” just before the
appendices, is essentially a “Comment” paper currently under review by J.
Phys. A (JPA), submitted on December 13, 2011. It is not identical because a
few expositional improvements have been made, but there are no differences of
substance.
Inquiries of May 13 and July 18 yielded courteous responses, but no sub-
stantive information about its status except that it is being considered by a
referee. As of this writing, September 20, 2012, over nine months after initial
submission, I have no idea what might be its status.
By comparison, DJ was accepted about a month after submission. It was
first received on October 13, 2011, and I was notified on November 13 by J.
Phys. A. that it had been accepted.
There is a story here, but this is not the place to tell it. Further information
can be found on the “papers” page of my website, www.math.umb.edu/∼sp.
Note added February 8, 2013:
The above were the circumstances when the previous Version 6 of this work
was posted. Subsequently, the “Comment” was rejected, but not for any sub-
stantive reason.
In particular, there was no objection to its mathematics. No referees’ reports
were included with the rejection, and the only “reason” given was that rejection
was the “most satisfactory” course for the journal. After I specifically requested
the referees’ reports, JPA admitted that they had been unable to obtain any.
Details, including the rejection letter, can be found at www.math.umb.edu/∼sp.
The authors (Dressel and Jordan) subsequently published in JPA a “Corri-
gendum” [2] which acknowledges a gap in the proof of the “General theorem”
7(GT) of DJ [1]. They present a Lemma which they think fills the gap, presented
in a way which suggests that it answers Version 6’s objections to DJ’s attempted
proof of its GT.
However, I dispute that the Lemma does fill the gap in the proof of the
GT. The authors have chosen to ignore Version 6’s objection to DJ’s attempted
proof.
In the context of DJ’s attempted proof, the Corrigendum’s Lemma is essen-
tially equivalent to the Conjecture which is the centerpiece of the present work,
though the statements of the Lemma and Conjecture are superficially different.
The Corrigendum does not mention the Conjecture,10 which Version 6 states
that I believed I had proved.
I believe that the Lemma of the Corrigendum, if correct, would only establish
the GT for the case of a “linear” POVM (defined in subsequent subsections).
The Conjecture stated that the GT would be true under this additional “lin-
earity” hypothesis.
However, the proof of the Lemma appears to be fatally flawed due to a
calculational error. This Version 7 adds a final Appendix 3 which pinpoints
the error and gives a simple algebraic proof of an important special case of the
Lemma/Conjecture.11
I apologize to the reader for what may seem like confusing updates like this
one added here and there. I have put an enormous amount of work into trying
to unravel the densely written claims of DJ, and I have neither the energy nor
desire to rewrite the whole thing. Also, I think that the semi-chronological
presentation may provide useful insights into the procedures and professional
standards of JPA.
Quite a few morals could be drawn from the history of the present work,
but I leave their formulation to the reader. To preserve the historical record, I
have not altered Version 6 from here to the final Appendix 3. The only typo
that I have noticed in Version 6 is one phrase “take into count” where “take
into account” was intended.
2.2 The submitted “Comment” paper (with minor correc-
tions)
2.2.1 Introduction to the submitted “Comment” paper
Notation will be the same as in the article under review [1], called DJ below.
To compress this Comment to a traditional length, we must assume that the
reader is already familiar with DJ. Its main purpose seems to be to justify a
statement of [3] (called DAJ below) that a “general conditioned average” intro-
duced in DAJ “converges uniquely to the quantum weak value in the minimal
10 The Conjecture is prior to any public (and, to my knowlege, private) statement of DJ’s
Lemma. DJ learned of the Conjecture from privileged information—a copy of the submitted
“Comment” furnished them by JPA before it was publicly posted.
11When Version 6 was posted, I had convinced myself that I could prove the full
Lemma/Conjecture, but refrained from claiming this because I’ve not wanted to invest the
time to write out the proof in full. It was not much trouble to write out the special case.
8disturbance limit”. DJ formulates “sufficient conditions” as hypotheses for a
“General theorem” (GT) with this statement as its conclusion.
For simplicity, we shall only consider the special case of DAJ and DJ’s “min-
imal disturbance” condition for which all measurement operators {Mˆj} are
positive. (All statements will also hold for DJ’s slightly more general defini-
tion.) The associated positive operator valued measure (POVM) is {Eˆj} with
Eˆj := Mˆ
†
jMˆj . The measurement operators Mˆj = Mˆj(g) depend on a small
“weakness” parameter g which quantifies the degree to which the measurement
affects the system being measured. Our “minimal disturbance limit” will refer
to the so-called “weak limit” g → 0 for positive measurement operators.
DAJ claims that under these assumptions, its “general conditioned average”
(corresponding to what is more usually called a “weak” measurement followed
by a postselection) is given by the traditional “quantum weak value” (the real
part of DJ’s (1.1)) in the weak limit g → 0:12
“This technique leads to a natural definition of a general conditioned
average that converges uniquely to the quantum weak value in the
minimal disturbance limit.”
Counterexamples to this claim were given in [7], examples which DJ attempts
to refute by reinterpreting the hypotheses of its “General theorem”(GT) given
in the first version of DJ, arXiv:1106.1871v1. Unfortunately, DJ does not make
explicit this reinterpretation, but some such reinterpretation is necessary for
their objection to make sense.
The mathematics of these counterexamples is undisputed;13 the only issue is
whether they satisfy the hypotheses of DAJ or DJ. DJ correctly notes that the
first counterexample using 2 × 2 measurement matrices does not satisfy what
they call the “pseudoinverse prescription”, but DAJ does not clearly state this
prescription as a hypothesis.14 The second counterexample using 3×3 matrices
does satisfy the pseudoinverse prescription, so the following will deal exclusively
with this counterexample.
12The term “minimally disturbing measurement” for a measurement with positive measure-
ment operators was used (and perhaps coined) in the recent book [9] of Wiseman and Milburn.
This reference was unfortunately not cited in DAJ, which uses the term “minimal disturbance
limit” without definition or intuitive explanation. I’ve not seen the term used elsewhere in the
literature outside of DAJ and subsequent papers by its authors. The technical definition of
the phrase “minimally disturbing measurement” as referring to a measurement with positive
measurement operators” does not correspond to the meaning which one might assume from
ordinary usage of the words “minimally disturbing”. (This is discussed in more detail in [6],
Section 11.)
For simplicity of exposition, our definition of “minimal disturbance limit” will be essentially
that of Wiseman and Milburn: the limit g → 0 for positive measurement operators, even
though DJ uses a slightly more general definition. All statements will also hold for DJ’s
definition.
13However, DJ does correctly note a typo in the definition of one of the measurement
operators in [7]; a
√
1/3 had been mistakenly written as 1/3. However the correct value was
used in the subsequent calculations, so apart from this single substitution, no other alterations
in the argument of [7] are necessary. I thank the authors for this helpful correction.
14This is discussed in more detail in Appendix 2 and [7].
9Contrary to claims of DJ, this counterexample is valid when the hypothe-
ses of the “General theorem” (GT) are interpreted as written, according to
standard usage of logical language. However, DJ’s attempted refutation of the
counterexamples requires a great strengthening of one of these hypotheses, a
strengthening not noted in DJ. We shall see that when so strengthened, the
hypotheses of the GT seem very close to the assumption that the POVM must
be a linear polynomial in the weak measurement parameter g, i.e.,
Eˆj(g) = Eˆ
(0)
j + gEˆ
(1)
j where Eˆ
0
j and Eˆ
(1)
are constant operators. (8)
The analysis leading to this conclusion will be straightforward and simple.
DJ’s attempted proof of the GT is densely written, and our analysis of it must
be correspondingly technical. Although probably few readers will be sufficiently
familiar with the proof to convince themselves either of its truth or of the claim
that there is a major error, I hope that the analysis may motivate anyone
tempted to employ (or cite without comment) the “General theorem” to first
carefully scrutinize its proof.
2.2.2 Unstated hypotheses for the “General theorem”
The hypotheses of the “General theorem”(GT) which will concern us are:
“(iii) The equality Aˆ =
∑
j αj(g)Eˆj(g) must be satisfied, where the
contextual values αj(g) are selected according to the pseudo-
inverse prescription.
(iv) The minimum nonzero order in g for all Eˆj(g) is g
n such that
(iii) is satisfied.”
“Minimum nonzero order” is not a standard mathematical phrase, but I take
its occurrence in (iv) to mean that
Eˆj(g) = Eˆ
(0)
j + g
n
∞∑
k=0
Eˆ
(k+n)
j g
k (9)
with Eˆ
(m)
j constant operators and Eˆ
(n)
j 6= 0. This is the way the phrase is used
(just after DJ’s equation (5.2)) in the attempted proof of the GT. It is used
in exactly the same way on p. 11 of DJ’s analysis of the counterexample, (just
before equation (7.4)) to conclude that the “lowest nonzero order” n for the
counterexample is n = 1. This is important because the only way to interpret
(iv) as referring to truncations seems to require a completely different interpre-
tation of “minimum nonzero order”, as will be discussed more fully in Appendix
1.
Then the logical content of (iv) is that all Eˆj have the same minimum
nonzero order, which is to be denoted n.15 This is a strange and quite restrictive
assumption for a “General theorem”, but it will not be our main concern.
15The restrictive phrase “such that (iii) is satisfied” is logically redundant, since (iii) has
already been assumed. If the authors mean that some alteration of (iii) is to be assumed,
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When the hypotheses of the GT are given the standard logical interpretation
just described, the counterexample using 3× 3 matrices which DJ attempts to
refute is indeed a counterexample to the GT. However, DJ’s attempt to refute
the counterexample appears to assume something like the following,
Denote by Eˆ
′
j(g) the truncation of the series (9) to its minimum nonzero
order n, namely,
Eˆ
′
j(g) := Eˆ
(0)
j + Eˆ
(n)
j g
n . (10)
Then (iv) assumes (iii) with the Eˆj(g) in (iii) replaced by Eˆ
′
j(g), but
with the contextual values αj(g) unchanged (i.e., the contextual values
for the truncated POVM {Eˆ
′
j(g)} are the same as for the original POVM
{Eˆj(g)}). More explicitly, it assumes that∑
j
αj(g)Eˆ
′
j(g) = Aˆ, (11)
where the αj(g) satisfy the pseudo-inverse prescription for the truncated
POVM.
DJ’s objection to the counterexample, given after its equation (7.4), is that
it does not satisfy (11). DJ does not explicitly say that the contextual values for
the truncated POVM are the same as for the original POVM, but that seems
suggested by the fact that it uses the same symbols, αj(g) for both. Also, the
details of DJ’s attempted proof support that interpretation.
Next recall that (iii) assumes that the contextual values ~α(g) = (α1(g), . . . , αn(g))
satisfy the “pseudoinverse prescription”
~α = F+~a, (12)
where ~a is a list of eigenvalues for the system observable Aˆ, and F+ is the
Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse for the matrix
F = F (g) := [ ~E1(g), . . . , ~En(g)]. (13)
Here the column vector ~Ej(g) is the list of eigenvalues for Eˆj(g), and F is the
matrix composed of those columns. Note that F is g-dependent, but we write
F = F (g) only when necessary to emphasize this point, to avoid possible confu-
sion with the result of applying the matrix F to a vector. If contextual values
exist (in general, they don’t), they are uniquely determined by the “pseudoin-
verse prescription” (12).
such as (iii) with the Eˆj replaced by their truncations to order n or (iii) with the original
contextual values previously denoted αj(g) replaced by others or some combination of these,
then standard logical language requires that this be explicitly stated. I have considered several
alternative interpretations of (iv), but all have led to inconsistencies with other parts of DJ.
In the absence of requested clarification from the authors, I selected the one which seems most
nearly consistent with the rest of DJ.
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Since the contextual values for the truncated POVM {Eˆ
′
j(g)} are assumed
the same as those for the original and to also satisfy the pseudo-inverse pre-
scription for the truncated POVM, we also have
~α = F ′
+
~a (14)
with
F ′ := [ ~E′1(g), . . . , ~E
′
n(g)], (15)
where the ~E′j(g) are the column vectors of eigenvalues for Eˆ
′
j(g). Equation (14)
also uniquely determines the contextual values αj(g), so it would be surprising
if both (12) and (14) would hold except in the trivial case in which Eˆj = Eˆ
′
j
for all j. In that case, we can make {Eˆj} linear (i.e., of form (1)) by replacing
the parameter g by a new parameter h := gn, so for brevity we shall refer to
this as the “linear case”. The hypothesis that both do hold seems very close to
a hypothesis that the original POVM be linear. Indeed, I do not know of any
example of a nonlinear POVM for which both (12) and (14) can hold.
2.2.3 Error or gap in proof
Readers thinking of building on the work of DAJ and DJ may need to convince
themselves of the validity of its “General theorem” (GT). Since its attempted
proof is densely written, it may help to pinpoint what I think is a critical error
(or at least a serious gap), even under the strong hypothesis that the POVM is
linear.
This hypothesis is equivalent to the assumption that the matrix F = F (g)
determining the contextual values ~α is first order in g, in which case the min-
imum nonzero order of F which the proof calls n is n = 1. To expose the
gap, we use these assumptions to rewrite the questionable part of the proof
in a simplified form. It applies to a matrix F with singular value decomposi-
tion F = UΣV T , where Σ is a diagonal matrix and “U and V are orthogonal
matrices”. All of these matrices depend on the weak limit parameter g.
The contextual values ~α (which the proof renames ~α0) are determined by the
pseudoinverse prescription ~α = ~α0 = F
+~a, where ~a is the vector of eigenvalues of
A. Here F+ is the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of F , given by F+ = V Σ+UT ,
where Σ+ is the diagonal matrix obtained from Σ by inverting all its nonzero
elements.
In reading the following, please keep in mind that if correct, it should apply
to anymatrix function F = F (g). Although an F = F (g) derived from a POVM
has a special form given in part by DJ’s preceding equation (5.9), nothing in
the following proof fragment uses this special form.
The proof mentions “relevant” singular values, but for brevity I have omit-
ted the definition of “relevant” (which does not involve the special form of F )
because for the simple counterexample to be given, all we have to know is that
a “relevant” singular value is a particular kind of singular value, as the syntax
implies. The simplified proof fragment is:
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Since the orthogonal matrices U and V have nonzero orthogonal limits
limg→0 U = U0 and limg→0 V = V0 , such that U
T
0 U0 = V0V
T
0 = 1, and
since ~a is g-independent, then the only poles in the solution ~α0 = F
+~a =
V Σ+UT~a must come from the inverses of the relevant singular values in
Σ+.
Therefore, to have a pole of order higher than 1/g1, there must be at least
one relevant singular value with a leading order greater than g1.
[This much seems all right, though many details are omitted, but I cannot
follow the next and last paragraph of DJ’s attempted proof.]
However, if that were the case then the expansion of F to order g1 would
have a relevant singular value of zero and therefore could not satisfy (5.12),
contradicting the assumption (iv) about the minimum nonzero order of
the POVM. Therefore, the pseudoinverse solution ~α0 = F
+~a can have no
pole with order higher than O(1/g) and the theorem is proved.
If correct, the above proof fragment would imply that if a linear matrix function
F (g) = P + gQ, with P and Q constant matrices, has a singular value with a
leading order greater than g1, then it also has a singular value which is identically
zero. (Put differently, the proof claims that if no singular value is identically
zero for all g, then all singular values are O(g1).) However, it is easy to construct
counterexamples such as
F :=
[
1 + g 1
−1 −1 + g
]
, (16)
which has singular values [g2 + 2− 2
√
g2 + 1]1/2 = g2/2 +O(g4) and [g2 + 2+
2
√
g2 + 1]1/2 = 2 + g2/2 +O(g4).
Without performing the somewhat messy calculation of the singular values,
one can see directly from Cramer’s rule that since detF (g) = g2, F (g)−1 ∼ g−2
which would make the contextual values ~α = F−1~a asymptotic to g−2. The
essence of the full proof of the GT is to show (continuing to assume n = 1
for simplicity) that the contextual values are O(1/g), which implies that the
“numerator correction” of DJ’s (5.7) vanishes in the limit g → 0.
Let us try to follow in detail the last paragraph of the proof in the context of
the counterexample. Applied to the F of (16), the last paragraph asserts that
if F has a singular value of leading order greater than g1 (which it does), then
“the expansion of F to order g1 would have a relevant singular value of zero
. . .”. However, this is wrong because the expansion of F to order g1 is F itself,
and all singular values are positive for small g 6= 0.
I suspect that the last paragraph of the attempted proof may be based on an
erroneous implicit assumption that truncating a Σ corresponding to F (g) will
produce the Σ for the truncated F , i.e., that truncation commutes with taking
of singular values. Otherwise, how could one possibly relate the Σ corresponding
to F in (5.12) to the different Σ corresponding to the linear truncation of F?
(Even assuming this relation, additional argument seems required to justify the
last paragraph of the proof fragment.)
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To make the above more explicit, write Σ = Σ(F ) to indicate the dependence
of the matrix Σ of singular values on F , and write τ(F ) for the linear truncation
of F . I can begin to make sense of the last paragraph only by assuming that
Σ(τ(F )) = τ(Σ(F ));
which says that the singular values for the truncated F are the truncations of
the singular values for F . The counterexample shows that this is false for its F
which satisfies τ(F ) = F :
Σ(τ(F )) = Σ(F ) =
[
2 + g2/2 +O(g4) 0
0 g2/2 +O(g4)
]
6=
[
2 0
0 0
]
= τ(Σ(F )).
Recall that (11) was my best guess at the intended expansion of DJ’s hypoth-
esis (iv) from its logical meaning. (A direct request to the authors to confirm or
correct this was ignored.) My next best guess would be that the αj(g) in (11)
might represent contextual values for the truncated POVM {Eˆ
′
j} that would
not necessarily be contextual values for the original POVM {Eˆj}. However, the
above objection to the proof would still apply.
2.3 Further remarks on the relation of hypothesis (iv) to
a hypothesis that the POVM be linear
Whatever the intended meaning of DJ’s (iv), in view of DJ’s objection to the
counterexample, (iv) presumably imposes some condition on the linear trunca-
tion (still taking n = 1 for simplicity) of the original POVM {Eˆj(g)}. This
seems an unreasonable hypothesis for a theorem billed as “General”. Certainly
the original claim of DAJ that its “general conditioned average” “converges
uniquely to the quantum weak value in the minimal disturbance limit” gives
no hint that unstated hypotheses necessary to validate the claim would fail to
apply to simple cases such as the later counterexample of [7] with POVM which
is quadratic in g.
DAJ gives the strong impression that the traditional weak value is essentially
inevitable when the measurement operators are positive. DJ gives the same
impression under the newly added hypothesis that the measurement operators
commute with each other and the system observable Aˆ, along with explicit
assumption of the pseudoinverse prescription. A main point of both [7] and the
present Comment is to dispel any such false impressions.
There is nothing in DAJ even close to hypothesis (iv) of DJ’s “General
theorem”. The precise meaning which the authors attribute to (iv) is unclear,
but if it is (11) or anything close to that, its physical meaning seems very
obscure. Given a POVM {Eˆj(g)}, contextual values need not exist. DAJ’s
ideas apply only to cases when they do exist. The physical meaning of this is
clear—only in that case will the average value Tr[Aρ] of the system observable
in any state ρ equal the sum
∑
j αjTr[Eˆj(g)ρ] of average POVM measurements
weighted by the contextual values αj . But the physical meaning of additionally
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assuming that contextual values exist for a truncation of {Eˆj(g)} seems very
obscure, and that appears to be an essential part of the authors’ interpretation
of hypothesis (iv).
Another way to look at this is that (iv) seems to assume that if contextual
values exist for a given POVM, then contextual values also exist for a linear
POVM. Viewed in this way, for practical purposes, (iv) seems very close (though
not precisely mathematically equivalent) to a hypothesis that the POVM be
linear.
2.4 Status of the “General theorem” for linear POVM’s
It should be emphasized that (16) is only a counterexample to DJ’s attempted
proof, not a counterexample to the conclusion of the GT under the assumption
that the POVM is linear, i.e., of the form (8). For a counterexample to the
conclusion, one would need an F which is derived from a POVM.
Actually, I conjecture that the conclusion that the “general conditioned av-
erage” is given by DJ’s (1.2) (i.e., the traditional weak value generalized to
mixed states) is true for linear POVM’s under the other hypotheses of DJ. If
so, its proof will surely have to use in some essential way the special form of an
F which comes from a POVM (e.g., all rows sum to 1).
I have sketched such a proof but have not written it in detail, so I make
no claims. I will be happy to share the ideas of the proof with any qualified
person who might be interested in expanding on them. They are not difficult,
but annoyingly detailed. If I decide not to write them up in journal-ready detail
myself, I may put a sketch of a proof on my website, www.math.umb.edu/∼sp.
A main aim of this Comment is to focus attention on the case of lin-
ear POVM’s. If the conjecture is true, it might help to explain why (to my
knowledge) actual experiments have only observed the traditional weak value
ℜ(〈ψf |Aˆ|ψi〉/〈ψf |ψi〉), despite the fact that arbitrary weak values can be ob-
tained from different measurement procedures, as stressed by DJ.16 Since these
experiments are difficult and have only recently been performed, perhaps they
correspond to the simplest POVM’s, e.g., linear POVM’s arising from positive
measurement operators.
Update September 21, 2012:
The arXiv version 1 of Dressel and Jordan’s [4], posted on October 3, 2011,
contains a “Theorem” which the authors characterize as a “slight generalization”
of the “General theorm” (GT) of DJ [1], with essentially the same attempted
proof that the present work criticizes. There is no mention that this “Theorem”
was disputed in [7], which is not even referenced. (The omission was deliberate
because the authors did not correct it in a later version after I pointed it out to
them.)
Version 2 of [4], posted in the arXiv on February 27, 2012 and published
in Phys. Rev. A on Feb. 29, 2012, contains essentially the same “Theorem”
but with a substantially different attempted proof. Hypothesis (iv) has been
16See [8] or the list of references [10] of DJ.
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somewhat clarified, and a lemma (their Lemma 1) has been added which in
the context of the proof is essentially the “Theorem” with a hypothesis that
the POVM be linear, i.e., Lemma 1 is essentially equivalent to the Conjecture
which is the centerpiece of this article.
The Conjecture is not mentioned. This can perhaps be understood from the
fact that the authors learned of the present work and the Conjecture from a
review copy of the present work furnished them for their reply by JPA between
December 13, 2011 (when the present work was submitted and February 14,
2012 (when the authors replied). According to published ethical standards of
the American Physical Society, it is unethical to use privileged information like
review copies for professional advancement without the permission of the author
of the reviewed work. (My permission was never requested.) Or, perhaps the
authors independently noticed that the proof of the GT in DJ [1] was wrong
and therefore thought it unnecessary to mention the Conjecture.
Modulo technical mathematical details which I have not checked, it looks
as if the proof of their Lemma 1 could be correct. If so, that will settle the
Conjecture.
However, I think that the objection above to the proof of DJ’s GT also
applies to the attempted proof of the full “Theorem” (i.e., for a not necessar-
ily linear POVM) of the published version of [4]. That is, I don’t agree that
the “Theorem” of the final version of [4] (nor the GT) has been proved. How-
ever, that seems of minor consequence since hypothesis (iv) is so close to an
assumption that the POVM be linear.
I have requested a copy of the authors’ reply to the review copy of the present
work, both from JPA and the authors. JPA refused. I get the impression that is
because they think it would be unfair to furnish the “Reply” to a “Comment”
before the “Comment” is accepted; otherwise the author of the “Comment”
could modify it in light of the “Reply”. This would make sense to me only if
one adopted the attitude that a search for the truth of the “General theorem”
(GT) must necessarily be adversarial. If the authors have some valid objection
to my claim that there is a serious gap in DJ’s attempted proof of the GT,
then, depending on the nature of the objection, either the present “Proof Gap”
should be withdrawn, or it should be modified to take into count the objection
(with proper acknowledgement of the authors’ contribution). It would be much
more useful to readers that way, with at least some agreement among all parties
acknowledged.
The authors have ignored my request for a copy. The point is that I have
made every effort to assure the accuracy of the present work. If I have fallen
short in any way, it is not for lack of inquiry.
Readers who want to know whether the GT is sound without dissecting its
dense and not entirely clearly written attempted proof will look to see if this
“Comment” is ever published by JPA. But it seems quite possible that it will
never be published, not because of any demonstrable error, but because no
referee will be willing to invest the time to read the proofs in detail. The fact
that over nine months have passed since the present work was submitted almost
certainly indicates that it has been, and remains, gathering dust on the desk
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of some referee or editor of JPA. It will probably remain that way indefinitely
until someone devises a pretext to accept or reject it without reading it.
Thus publication status is unlikely to be a reliable indication of correctness.
A more reliable indicator may be that the published version of [4] substantially
alters DJ’s attempted proof of the GT in ways which appear to respond to
criticisms of the present work. That seems a tacit admission that the present
claim of a gap in the proof of the GT has substance.
3 Appendix 1: Guesses at the meaning of hy-
pothesis (iv)
When I saw the grounds on which DJ disputed the counterexample of [7], I
was stunned. Never had I even considered the possibility that hypothesis (iv)
might refer to truncations, and had I considered it, I would have rejected it
as implausible. I still find it hard to imagine that any careful reader could
confidently assert that (iv) referred to truncations, much less be confident of
any definite meaning regarding truncations.
After DJ was accepted and I began to prepare this Comment, I have thought
a great deal about possible interpretations of (iv). The authors’ intended mean-
ing is still not clear to me. All interpretations which I have considered are either
logically unacceptable or inconsistent with some part of DJ.
This appendix analyzes the interpretations which I have considered. I have
debated whether it would be worth while to include it, since I imagine that few
readers will be interested in investing their time in a detailed logical deconstruc-
tion of (iv). I decided to include it for three reasons.
First, it may serve to alert readers to logical problems with the statement of
the GT even if they choose not to study them in detail. Second, I hope that it
may motivate the authors of DJ to state (iv) precisely in correct logical language
in any reply to the Comment, so that readers can make informed decisions based
on a definite knowledge of what DJ intended to assume. Third, since apparently
no referees’ report has yet been received over eight months after submission,17
I hope it may assist the referee. I assume that the referee who recommended
acceptance of DJ without clarification of (iv) had not thought carefully about
its logical meaning.
Recall the hypotheses (iii) and (iv) of DJ’s “General theorem” (GT) both
as originally posted in arXiv:1106.1871v1 and subsequently in DJ:
“(iii) The equality Aˆ =
∑
j αj(g)Eˆj(g) must be satisfied, where the
contextual values αj(g) are selected according to the pseudo-
inverse prescription.
(iv) The minimum nonzero order in g for all Eˆj(g) is g
n such that
(iii) is satisfied.”
17The referee has my sincere sympathy. If he is conscientious enough to try to actually
determine the correctness of DJ’s densely written proof based on unclearly stated hypotheses,
it will take far more time than is reasonable to ask of an unpaid volunteer.
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The statement of hypothesis (iv) is very peculiar, certainly not correct logical
language. To analyze it, we need to review a few elementary principles of logic.
What is the meaning of the statement:
“x = 2” ?
I surely hope that the reader mentally replied that it is meaningless in isolation.
It is a so-called “open sentence” to which something must be added to give it
meaning, i.e., to convert it into a logical statement which is either true or false.
It might also conceivably be taken as a definition of the symbol “x”, though
this would not be correct logical language for a definition.
It can be given meaning by defining x before stating “x = 2”. For example,
if x were previously defined as:
Let x denote the largest positive integer which satisfies the equation
x5 − x3 − 24 = 0 ,
then “x=2” would be a logically meaningful statement which would be definitely
true or false (though we might not know which).
To phrase the definition of x just above as
x is the largest positive integer which satisfies the equation
x5 − x3 − 24 = 0
would not be correct logical language for a definition. Though some readers
might be able to guess that it was intended as a definition of the symbol x, it
is so far from accepted logical language that any logically trained person would
have to question what was meant. It could not be justified as a logical shorthand
because the previous correctly stated definition is no more complicated. This is
analogous to (iv) with an inessential change of word order: gn is the minimum
nonzero order in g . . . .
In (iv), the symbol n has not been previously defined, so if (iv) is not to be
treated as meaningless, the best guess at the authors’ meaning is probably that
(iv) is intended as a definition of n. But (iv) is supposed to be a hypothesis (i.e.,
a logical statement assumed true), not a definition.
Let us put (iv) aside for the moment to examine another logical principle. We
noted that in isolation, “x = 2” is meaningless as a logical statement (because
there is no way, even in principle, to assign it a truth value). One way to make it
meaningful is to predefine x. Another is to prepend one of the so-called logical
“quantifiers” ∀ (“for all” or “for every”) and ∃ (“there exists”), e.g.,
∀ integers x, x = 2 (a meaningful statement which happens to be
false)
or
∃ an integer x such that x = 2 (a meaningful though somewhat silly
statement which happens to be true).
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In the second statement, the phrase “such that” is logically unnecessary (and
customarily omitted in formal logic), but is added to make the sentence read
well in English. Also, a necessary specification of the so-called “universe of
discourse” (in this case that we are talking about integers) has been added to
both statements. (If the universe of discourse had been previously specified,
this would be unnecessary.)
Having made these points explicit, let us return to (iv). Suppose we tem-
porarily ignore the last clause in (iv) and for purposes of examination write the
remainder by itself:
(iv) The minimum nonzero order in g for all Eˆj(g) is g
n such that
. . . .
This is a strange wording which no logician would use, so I hate to analyze
further without changing the word order to obtain more nearly correct logical
language which (so far as I can guess at the authors’ intention) carries the same
logical meaning:
(iv) For all Eˆj(g), the minimum nonzero order in g is g
n such that
. . . .
For this to begin to make sense, we would have to know what is meant by
“minimum nonzero order”, which is not a standard mathematical phrase. From
the way it is used in the proof of the GT and elsewhere,18 I assume that it
means that
Eˆj(g) = Eˆ
(0)
j + g
nEˆ
(n)
j +O(g
n+1) . (17)
with the Eˆ
(m)
j constant operators and Eˆ
(n)
j 6= 0.
19 The statement (iv) just
above is still not meaningful because n remains undefined, but no matter what
integer n stands for, the statement does imply that all the Eˆj(g) have the
same minimum nonzero order gn. If we take this common minimum nonzero
order as the definition of n, then the statement becomes meaningful. Though
still strangely worded, it could conceivably be interpreted as saying that all the
Eˆj(g) have the same minimum nonzero order, which is to be denoted n.
But what of the restrictive clause beginning “such that” which we sup-
pressed? This clause is
“. . . such that (iii) is satisfied”.
But we have already assumed that (iii) is satisfied, so the restrictive clause
implies no restriction at all.
At this point, an experienced reader will become uneasy, and indeed I did.
I asked myself why the authors would add a restrictive clause which was no
18p. 8 just after (5.2) and p. 11 just before (7.4). Both of these passages unequivocally imply
that given a POVM, one can determine its “minimum nonzero order” n from (9), without
consideration of the ”such that” restriction of (iii). For example p. 11 states that the “lowest
nonzero order” for the counterexample is n = 1 before considering (iii).
19A request to the authors to confirm or correct this was ignored.
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restriction at all. Could the authors have some other meaning in mind, but have
expressed it in a logically incorrect way? In trying to guess other meanings, I
came up with only one plausible possibility, but it turned out to be inconsistent
with something else in DJ. Next we will examine this possibility. If a referee did
not think very carefully about possible meanings for (iv), it might superficially
seem a reasonable possibility.
One sometimes sees statements in the physics literature similar to:
ex = 1 + x+ x2/2 to order x2,
meaning that the truncations to order x2 of the Taylor series of both sides are
equal. Could (iv) carry a similar meaning?
Well, (iii) is already assumed to hold exactly, so it holds to all orders in g,
so if we interpret (iv) as defining n as the smallest nonzero order to which (iii)
holds, then (iv) would define n := 1 no matter what the POVM {Eˆj(g)} was.
It doesn’t seem as if that would be the authors’ intention. Otherwise, why not
simply define n := 1?
Now we enter the realm of real guesswork. Could (iv) be intended to mean
the following, or something like it?
There exists a positive integer n such that (iii) holds with each Eˆj(g)
replaced by its truncation to order n, i.e., if
Eˆj(g) =
∞∑
k=0
Eˆ
(k)
j g
k
and we define Eˆ
′
j(g) by
Eˆ
′
j(g) :=
n∑
k=0
Eˆ
(k)
j g
k ,
then (iii) holds with the original Eˆj(g) replaced by their truncations
Eˆ
′
j(g), ∑
j
αjEˆ
′
j(g) = Aˆ , (iii)
′
and moreover, the “minimum nonzero order n” is defined to be the least
positive integer n for which equation (iii)′ holds.
Note how the quantifier there exists, which is absent from (iv), is very important
to both the logical and intuitive meaning. It alerts the reader that a nontrivial
existence is being assumed, an existence which cannot be taken for granted.
Compare the clarity of this with (iv). Contextual values need not exist. Even
if contextual values do exist for a POVM, there is no reason that they should
exist for truncations of that POVM. (That they do not for the counterexample
is basically DJ’s objection to it.) To assume that contextual values necessarily
exist for some truncations is a strong assumption with obscure physical meaning.
In case (iv) was intended to be interpreted as just described, how many readers
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of (iv) would realize that it imposes such a strong hypothesis for the “General
theorem”?
Note also that the definition of “minimum nonzero order” proposed by (17)
as a stand-alone phrase has been abandoned. Now
“(iv) The minimum nonzero order in g for all Eˆj(g) is g
n such that (iii)
is satisfied”
is parsed as
Let “the minimum nonzero order n” denote the least of all positive inte-
gers n satisfying [a guess at a new meaning of a modified version of (iii)
involving n], where we assume that there exists such a positive integer.
This newly interpreted (iv) defines “minimum nonzero order n”, but the essence
of its meaning as a hypothesis is the existence assumption. If this is what the
authors of DJ meant, then the omission of the quantifier “there exists” in (iv)
would be a serious misstatement which would be almost guaranteed to result
in misinterpretations. All expansions of (iv) from its logical meaning as written
to a meaning which could invalidate the counterexample seem to require some
similar nontrivial and unstated existence assumption.
The above is still not logically definite because we have to guess if the αj
in (iii)′ are the same as already defined by the original (iii), or are defined
by the pseudoinverse prescription (which is part of (iii)) applied to the new,
truncated POVM {Eˆj
′
(g)}, or both. However, at least it has the potential to
give some interpretation of (iv) in terms of truncations, which is necessary for
DJ’s objection to the counterexample to make sense.
By now the reader’s head is probably spinning at the multiplicity of conceiv-
able interpretations, but mercifully, we do not have to consider all of them in
detail. That is because for the counterexample, there are no αj(g) which satisfy
(iii)′ for n = 1, as DJ shows.
Therefore, the least n for which (iii)′ could hold is n = 2, and it does hold for
n = 2 because the counterexample is quadratic in g and satisfies (iii). Therefore,
according to the interpretation of (iv) being considered, the minimum nonzero
order n for the counterexample is n = 2.
But DJ’s objection to the counterexample requires that n = 1. I have
wondered if DJ may be simultaneously assuming two inconsistent definitions
for n, the original definition of (17) used elsewhere in DJ20 and the different
definition introduced just above. DJ’s objection to the counterexample is valid
only if n = 1, but the objection also requires some interpretation of (iv) in
terms of truncations. If (iv) is interpreted in terms of truncations as above,
then n = 2.
Of course, I cannot rule out the possibility that DJ may be using some
wild interpretation of (iv) which I haven’t even considered. But in terms of
the above, DJ’s objection to the counterexample is invalid. Having published
“Sufficient conditions . . .”, unless the authors withdraw their objection to the
20see footnote 18
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counterexample, they have a professional obligation to furnish an unexception-
able statement of (iv), one which is clear and logically correct. Only then will
readers be able to understand what the GT actually asserts.
All this would become moot if the authors recognize that DJ’s attempted
proof of the GT is in error or incomplete. But if they come up with a revised
proof, they should give first priority to restating (iv) in a clear and logically
correct way.
4 Appendix 2: Misleading stateements in DJ’s
Section 3
This appendix discusses misleading statements in DJ’s Section 3 titled “Analysis
of a counter-example” [1]. That section discusses an early counterexample [6, 7]
to a main claim of DAJ [3]. Most of what will be said has already been covered
in more detail in [7], so only a brief summary will be given here. I include it only
for completeness, so that DJ’s Section 3 will not be thought to go unchallenged.
That early counterexample employed three 2 × 2 matrices as measurement
operators. Unlike the later counterexample discussed in the main body of this
paper (which uses three 3 × 3 matrices), the earlier counterexample does not
satisfy the pseudoinverse prescription, which is explicitly assumed in DJ but not
in the earlier DAJ.
My initial interest in DAJ was aroused by the following claim:
Quote 1 from DAJ: “We introduce contextual values as a gener-
alization of the eigenvalues of an observable that takes into account
both the system observable and a general measurement procedure.
This technique leads to a natural definition of a general conditioned
average that converges uniquely to the quantum weak value in the
minimal disturbance limit.”
A counterexample to this claim using three 2× 2 matrices was given in [6] and
also in [7]. This counterexample does not satisfy the pseudoinverse prescription
for the simple reason that there was no reason to think that the authors might
have intended it intended it as a hypothesis for the claim of Quote 1 above.
Indeed, I happened to know that they did not initially intend it as a hypothesis
because an (incorrect) proof that they sent me in response to an inquiry about
DAJ did not assume it; more details are given in [7].
The only substantive21 reference to the pseudoinverse prescription in DAJ
is:
21DJ’s claim that “We devote a considerable amount of space to this type of underspecified
case [in DAJ] . . .” is at least misleading, and arguably false. They do devote a long paragraph
to a complicated method of calculating the pseudoinverse of a matrix, but that is standard
mathematical material which has nothing to do with reasons for using the pseudoinverse in
the first place. It could have been replaced by a reference to a standard mathematical text
which would have left space for a genuine discussion of the motivation for the pseudoinverse
prescription.
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Quote 2 from DAJ:
“We propose that the physically sensible choice of CV [contextual
values] is the least redundant set uniquely related to the eigenvalues
through the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse.”22
No reason is given why this should be “the physically sensible choice”. No
indication is given that this was to be a hypothesis for the claim of Quote 1.
DJ suggests that it should be obvious that this is a hypothesis because:
[From DJ, not DAJ] “All the examples we give in the paper [DAJ]
use the pseudoinverse, and this discussion occurs immediately before
the conditioned average [italics theirs] section under contention.”
This is a strange suggestion.
The “conditioned average” section of DAJ has never been under contention.
DAJ’s “conditioned average” is given by its equation (6), which does come after
the suggestion of Quote 2 that the pseudoinverse prescription is “the physically
sensible choice”, but before DAJ’s “Weak values” section which attempts to
justify the claim of Quote 1. The “Weak values” section is what is under
contention.
The short proof of DAJ’s expression (6) giving its “conditioned average”
does not require the hypothesis that the contextual values satisfy the pseudoin-
verse prescription. Do the authors contend that readers should conclude that
the pseudoinverse prescription (PIP) was intended as a hypothesis for (6) just
because Quote 2 came before (6) and even though the PIP is unnecessary for
its proof?
The first arXiv version of DJ (which differs substantially from the pub-
lished version), arXiv:1106.1871v1, gives the first indication of why the authors
consider the pseudoinverse prescription “the physically sensible choice”. It is
because the pseudoinverse prescription minimizes a particular upper bound for
the detector variance. It does not minimize the detector variance itself, and the
upper bound which it does minimize is not the best possible upper bound. This
situation is discussed in detail in [7], including a derivation of a sharper upper
bound, and the discussion will not be repeated here.
It is worth emphasizing that DAJ gives no reason whatever to use the pseu-
doinverse prescription (PIP), and the only reason that DJ gives is that it mini-
mizes a particular upper bound for the detector variance. But this has absolutely
nothing to do with weak values. It is hard to see how the authors could imagine
that readers of DAJ should obviously realize that the PIP should be intended
as a hypothesis for the “Weak values” section and the claim of Quote 1.
Call the upper bound which the pseudoinverse prescription does minimize
the “DJ upper bound” (DJUB), to distinguish it from other possible upper
bounds such as the better upper bound of [7]. Section 3 of DJ explicitly car-
ries out a messy calculation of the DJUB for both the contextual values of
22I puzzled for quite a while over the strange language “least redundant set uniquely related
to the eigenvalues through the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse”, which probably carries meaning
only to the authors. What they mean is (12) of the present article.
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the 2 × 2 counterexample and also for those determined by the pseudo-inverse
prescription, and finds that the latter is smaller. But this is built into the ab-
stract mathematics of the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse; there was no need to
calculate it explicitly.
DJ goes on to intimate that the pseudoinverse contextual values are physi-
cally superior to the contextual values of the counterexample, even though this
does not follow from the fact that the particular DJUB upper bound for the
pseudoinverse prescription is no more than the DJUB for any other choice of
contextual values (including that of the counterexample).23 However, even if it
did follow it would be completely irrelevant to the counterexample. The 2 × 2
counterexample was devised as a counterexample to the Quote 1 mathemati-
cal claim of DAJ, that its “general conditioned average . . . converges uniquely”
to the traditional weak value. The counterexample was posted well before DJ
revealed why the authors consider the pseudoinverse solution “the physically
sensible choice”. The counterexample was never claimed to have any physically
desirable properties.
Section 6.3 of [7] introduces a simple method of determining contextual val-
ues which minimizes the detector variance itself, not just DJ’s particular [DJUB]
upper bound to the detector variance. It does require knowing the probabili-
ties of the various detector outcomes, but this information is always available
to an arbitrary approximation (otherwise there would be no way to use the
detector to approximate the expectation of the system observable). If the au-
thors want to advocate for the pseudoinverse prescription, it would have been
more appropriate to compare it to the just-mentioned suggestion of [7] than to
a counterexample which was devised for a completely different purpose.
5 Afterword
Since I first became interested in the claims of DAJ over a year ago, pursuit of
those claims has turned into something of a nightmare. The present paper is
sufficiently technical that I imagine that it will have few, if any readers. Yet it
seems that it had to be written.
I would be surprised if the various papers by the DJ authors have many
readers, either. I have never encountered any reader who has demonstrated
knowledge of DAJ or DJ sufficiently detailed to discuss it in depth.
I have absolutely no doubt that any controversy over DJ’s “General theorem”
(GT) could be quickly settled by discussions between any two people who had
actually scrutinized its attempted proof. If the authors would discuss it with me,
we could probably settle the matter in very little time, and that it how it should
be settled. Only in the unlikely event that some fundamental disagreement
remained would it be necessary to involve journals and referees. It seems wrong
that the time of so many people is being unnecessarily wasted.
23Of course, the fact that an upper bound for quantity A is less than an upper bound for
quantity B does not imply that quantity A is less than quantity B.
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The physics literature is full of papers with questionable claims which were
probably routinely published with little or no meaningful scrutiny. Unless of ob-
viously fundamental importance, such claims are rarely withdrawn or corrected.
It is easy to get such papers published if the authors have appropriate creden-
tials, but very difficult to question them in print. Meaningful “peer review” is
minimal.
DJ may turn out to be yet another example. (I could furnish several.) DJ
was accepted almost immediately, within a month of submission, but the present
Comment has been in limbo for almost nine months, with no indication why.
That does not augur well for eventual acceptance.
I have no definite reason to think that it will be rejected, but I will not be
surprised if it happens. I would be surprised if the rejection were for substantive
reasons, such as a demonstrable error. Based on experiences with other journals,
I would instead expect the stated reason to be some vague value judgment which
would be impossible to contest, such as “too mathematical” or “too long for a
‘Comment’ ” or “uninteresting”.
Indeed, a journal may not even bother with a pretext. I have had the ex-
perience of a journal (not J. Phys. A) keeping a paper for over a year, with
uncommunicative responses to inquiries every few months about its status, only
to finally reject it with no referee’s report, no reason whatever given, no indica-
tion that it had ever been read, and no apology (not for rejecting it, but for the
way it was handled). A subsequent inquiry as to the reason for the rejection
went unanswered.
6 Appendix 3: The “Corrigendum”[2] to DJ
6.1 Introduction
This appendix was added around February 18, 2013.
Over a year after the present work questioned the proof of the GT, the
authors added a December, 2012, “Corrigendum” [2] acknowledging a gap in its
attempted proof. The sole content of the Corrigendum is a Lemma which, in
the context of DJ’s attempted proof of its GT, is essentially equivalent to the
Conjecture which is the centerpiece of the present work. The Corrigendum does
not mention the Conjecture.
This appendix points out a simple calculational error in the Corrigendum
which invalidates its proof of its Lemma. (I think that there is a more subtle
error as well.)
Then it will present an elementary proof of an important special case of the
Conjecture/Lemma. The special case may include most situations of physical
interest.
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6.2 Review of notation and definitions
The Corrigendum’s Lemma assumes a POVM {Eˆj(g)} whose elements are linear
polynomials in the “weak measurement” parameter g:
Eˆj(g) = Eˆ
(0)
j + gEˆ
(1)
j where Eˆ
0
j and Eˆ
(1)
are constant operators. (18)
(Actually, it replaces g with gn for some positive integer n, but this is obviously
equivalent and only complicates the notation.)
Recall that the “contextual values” αj(g) are chosen to satisfy
Aˆ =
∑
j
αj(g)Eˆj(g) , (19)
where Aˆ is the “system observable” whose expectation in a given state is to
be weakly measured. This equation will not always have a solution, but DJ
considers only situations in which it does. When there are multiple solutions,
DJ requires that the so-called “pseudoinverse prescription” be applied to single
out a unique solution.
It is also assumed that everything in sight is finite dimensional and that
the POVM elements Eˆj(g) and the system observable Aˆ mutually commute,
so that they are represented by finite, diagonal m × m matrices: Eˆj(g) =
diag(E1j (g), . . . , E
m
j (g)), Aˆ = diag(a1, . . . , am). Also write
~Ej := (E
1
j (g), . . . , E
m
j (g))
T ,
and ~a := (a1, . . . , am)
T . In terms of this notation, equation (19) can be written
F (g)~α(g) = ~a , (20)
where ~α(g) := (α1(g), . . . , αm(g))
T , and F = F (g) := [ ~E1(g), . . . , ~Em(g)] de-
notes the matrix whose columns are the ~Ej . Moreover, F is a linear polynomial
in g:
F (g) = P + gR , (21)
where P and R are constant matrices.
The Corrigendum’s notation replaces R with Fn (and also g with g
n as
previously noted), but this seems to invite confusion. I am trying to stay as
close as possible to the Corrigendum’s notation, but I find it hard to bring
myself to add gratuitous complications such as replacing g by gn and using the
potentially confusing Fn for the linear homogeneous part of F . Nevertheless,
the subsection analyzing the Corrigendum’s proof will use the Corrigendum’s
notation exclusively to avoid confusion.
6.3 Relation between our Conjecture and the Corrigen-
dum’s Lemma
DJ defines the singular values of a matrix F as the eigenvalues of (FFT )1/2. We
shall be interested in the case in which F = F (g) is as defined as above to be the
matrix which determines the contextual values via the equation F (g)~α(g) = ~a.
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One form of the polar decomposition of the real matrix F (g) is
F (g) = (F (g)F (g)T )1/2V (g) , (22)
with V (g) a partial isometry, with initial space the initial space In(F (g)) of
F (g) and final space the range of F (g).24 If the nullspace of F is nontrivial,
of course F−1 cannot exist in the strict sense, but we can define a (Moore-
Penrose) “pseudoinverse”, temporarily also denoted F−1, as the operator which
acts on the range of F as the inverse of F | In(F ) : In(F ) → Range(F ), and
annihilates the orthogonal complement of the range of F . In other words, for
w ∈ In(F ), F−1F (w) := w, and for v orthogonal to Range(F ), F−1v := 0.
Then
F (g)−1 = V (g)−1(F (g)(F (g)T )1/2)−1 = V (g)T (F (g)F (g)T )−1/2 . (23)
Since V (g) is bounded for all g, the contextual values
~α(g) := F (g)−1~a (24)
(which will exist iff ~a is in Range(F (g)) = In(F (g)F (g)T ) for small g, a basic
assumption of DJ) will be O(1/g) if (and, because of the special form of V (g),
only if) the nonzero singular values of F (g) (assumed analytic in g) have leading
order no greater than g1. The conclusion of the Corrigendum’s Lemma is that
the nonzero singular values do have leading order no greater than g1. Then as
noted in Section 2.2.3, ~α(g) = O(1/g) implies the Conjecture.25
I have reason to believe, but have not checked, that analyticity of the singu-
lar values follows from nontrivial theorems concerning analytic perturbations of
Hermitian matrices. (The Corrigendum does not address the analyticity, seem-
ing to take it for granted.) I have not checked it because relevant references
(e.g., a 1969 book of Rellich) are not readily available,26 and my proof of the
Conjecture established by means not requiring analyticity that the contextual
values are O(1/g). Because of that, I consider, the Lemma and Conjecture as
essentially equivalent in the context of the proof of the GT.
For the reader’s convenience, we reproduce the Corrigendum’s statement of
the Lemma and the first few lines of its proof.
24 The initial space In(F ) of a matrix is the orthogonal complement of its nullspace, which
is the subspace spanned by its rows. A partial isometry is an operator which is an isometry
when restricted to its initial space. Its range is called its final space.
An isometry is an operator which preserves norms (and, consequently, inner products), but
is not necessarily surjective. A surjective isometry on a real (complex) Hilbert space is called
orthogonal (unitary). In the typical case in which the F (g) are invertible, V (g) is orthogonal.
25This fact may not be easy to extract from published literature. It is the essence of DJ’s
attempted proof of the GT, but that is not easy to penetrate. It also follows from equation
(113) of [7].
26I live 200 miles from the nearest research library.
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“Lemma. The singular values of the M × N dimensional matrix
F = P + gnFn with M ≤ N have maximum leading order of g
n,
where P = [p1~1 . . . pn~1] and Fn = [ ~E1 . . . ~EN ] such that
∑
j pj = 1
and
∑
j
~Ej = ~0.
Proof. . . . . Since PTFn = 0, the latter has the simple form H =
PTP + g2nFTn Fn, . . . ” [The Proof had previously defined H :=
FTF .]
The authors don’t further explain their notation, but it is clear from the context
that ~1 stands for the column vector whose entries are all 1, and [ ~E1 . . . ~EN ] for
the matrix whose columns are the vectors ~Ej . An example of such P and Fn is:
P :=
[
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
]
, Fn :=
[
2 −2
2 −2
]
.
Then
PTFn =
[
2 −2
2 −2
]
= Fn 6= 0.
The Corrigendum’s proof does not actually require that PTFn = 0, but only
that PTFn + F
T
n P = 0. However, that is also false:
PTFn + F
T
n P = Fn + F
T
n =
[
4 0
0 4
]
6= 0.
The proof’s assertion that “PTFn = 0” would be true if the columns (instead
of just the rows) of Fn also summed to 0 . I confess that in my first readings of
the proof, I succumbed to that confusion in mental calculations of the matrices,
and believed that the subsequent proof could be correct. But the claimed form
of H = PTP + g2nFTn Fn seems essential to the subsequent analysis, so I think
the proof has to be considered invalid, or at least invalid as written.
6.4 Elementary proof of a special case of the Lemma/Conjecture
This subsection presents a straightforward elementary proof of what may be the
most important special case of the Lemma, namely the case in which F = F (g)
is an N ×N (i.e., square) matrix of the “linear” form (21) and is invertible for
g near 0. When F is square, which is probably the typical case for applications,
invertibility near zero is the “generic” case.
We shall show that for square, invertible F (g), the contextual values are
O(1/g). We shall do this using Cramer’s rule to obtain the contextual values.
We shall observe that for an arbitrary “linear” F = F (g) (not necessarily
invertible) which arises from a POVM, detF (g) is proportional to 1/gN−1. (Of
course, the constant of proportionality is nonvanishing if and only if F (g) is
invertible.)
By definition, a “linear” F = F (g) is of the form
F (g) = P + gR , (25)
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where P and R are constant matrices. In addition, an F (g) arising from a
POVM as described in subsection 6.2 satisfies the following conditions.
P =


p1 p2 . . . pm
p1 p2 . . . pm
. . .
p1 p2 . . . pm

 , (26)
where
∑
j pj = 1, in order to assure that {Eˆj} satisfies the defining condition∑
j Eˆj = Iˆ for a POVM, with Iˆ the identity matrix. That all columns of P
are multiples of (1, 1, . . . , 1)T follows from DJ’s hypothesis (i) for its “General
theorem”: that all measurement operators be nearly proportional to the identity
for small g to ensure that the measurement be weak for small g. Similarly, the
POVM condition implies that all rows of R sum to zero:
∑
j Rij = 0 for all i.
For an N × N matrix M , let ~Mj denote its j’th column, and write M =
[ ~M1 . . . ~MN ]. To compute detF (g), we think of the determinant of a matrix
as a multilinear function of its columns. Using multilinearity to expand the
determinant, gives it as a sum of terms of the form either detP or gN detR or
± gN−k det[~Ppi(1), ~Ppi(2), . . . , ~Ppi(k), ~Rpi(k+1), . . . , ~Rpi(N)] , (27)
where π(1), . . . , π(N) is a permutation of 1, . . . , N and 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1.
Because P has rank 1 (columns proportional), detP = 0, and because the
rows of R all sum to 0 (so that its columns are linearly dependent), also detR =
0. Also because P is rank 1, the only nonvanishing terms of (27) contain just
one column of P , i.e., k = 1. This shows that detF (g) is proportional to gN−1.
For future use, let us revisit the argument just given without using the
assumption that the rows of R sum to zero. In this case, we need not have
detR = 0, so we would conclude that detF (g) = (a+bg)gN−1 with a, b constant.
All (N−1)×(N−1) “minor matrices”27 M (ij)(g) of F (g) are of the “linear”
form (25):
M(ij)(g) = P
(ij) + gR(ij) , (28)
but the (N − 1) × (N − 1) matrices P (ij) and R(ij) need not satisfy all of the
auxiliary conditions of the original P and R. However, the P (ij) are still rank
1, so that their columns are proportional. In general, the rows of the R(ij) need
not sum to zero.
Cramer’s rule gives the contextual values αj(g) = (F
−1(g)~a)j as a sum of
terms, each of which is of the form
αj(g) = (F
−1(g)~a)j =
±ak detM
(jk)
detF (g)
Since we have already established that detF (g) is proportional to gN−1, to show
that αj(g) = O(1/g) it suffices to show that
detM (jk) = gN−2(cjk +O(g)) with cjk constants (possibly zero). (29)
27A “minor matrix” M (ij) of F is the (N−1)× (N−1) matrix obtained from F by deleting
the i’th row and j‘th column.
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Evaluating the minor matrices as we evaluated detF (g) gives a sum of terms,
each of which is proportional to either gN−1−1 = gN−2 as before plus one more
term equal to gN−1 detRij . (This additional term arises because the rows of
R(ij) need not sum to zero, so we cannot conclude that detR(ij) = 0 as in the
calculation of detF (g).) Each of these terms is of the desired form (29).
An earlier section mentioned that I believed I had proved the full Conjecture
(not just the special case above):
“I have sketched such a proof [of the Conjecture] but have not written it
in detail, so I make no claims. I will be happy to share the ideas of the
proof with any qualified person who might be interested in expanding on
them. They are not difficult, but annoyingly detailed.”
The annoying details arise when one tries to generalize to cases when F (g) may
not be invertible, or even square. Here one has to use DJ’s hypothesis that the
contextual values satisfy the pseudoinverse prescription. I hesitated to write
up that part because the authors’ stated reason for using the pseudoinverse
prescription is so unconvincing, as explained in Appendix 2 and [7]. So far as I
can see, the only reason to consider it would be to obtain the traditional weak
value for linear POVM’s. I am not sure why that would be important, so I
decided to invest my time otherwise.
6.5 What if the authors succeed in proving the Corrigen-
dum’s Lemma?
I came across the Corrigendum by accident only a few days ago—the Journal of
Physics A never notified me, much less asked my opinion of it. This appendix
was originally intended to discuss the proof of its Lemma, which seemed to me
not quite correct, though I thought I knew how to correct it. I was already
somewhat familiar with the Lemma via its previous appearance in [4], and
believed it to be essentially correct. I had not noticed the simple error exposed
above.
In the course of writing the Appendix, I did notice the simple error. It is
not the sort of error that I would expect from the authors of the Corrigendum,
and as of this writing, I find it hard to believe. I keep wondering if I might be
committing some simple error, perhaps an overlooked hypothesis or something
similar that would be hard for an author to notice.
Moreover, the error does not show that the conclusion of the Lemma is
wrong, only that its proof as written is incorrect. It is conceivable that the
authors could later produce a correct proof.
Even if so, I would still have to question the Corrigendum. It does not
address the proof gap discussed at the end of Section 2.2 of Version 6. Even
a correct Lemma would prove no more than the Conjecture which is the cen-
terpiece of the present work—that the conclusion of the GT holds for linear
POVM’s. It would not prove the full GT claimed by DJ.
The Corrigendum closes with an “Acknowledgement” thanking Version 6
of the present work for “urging us to justify this lemma”. Never publicly or
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privately did I urge the authors “to justify this lemma”. My submitted “Com-
ment” could be taken as urging them to justify the proof of the GT, but that
is not the same as justifying the Lemma.
I find it troubling that many might interpret the Acknowledgement as claim-
ing my implicit endorsement for the truth of the GT. Do the authors not realize
that “this lemma” does not establish the full GT, but only the Conjecture? Or
do they believe that the Lemma does justify the full GT, but that Version 6’s
objections to the GT’s proof (at the end of Section 2.2) are unworthy of reply?
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